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1.  Introduction  
From 2007, many investment banks have undergone bankruptcy and restructuring in 
the USA and some commercial banks in Europe and Britain have suffered heavy 
deficits and low liquidity. The subprime crisis which first happened in 2007 in 
America spread to Europe and finally erupted into a global financial crisis. The 
impacts of this crisis were not as apparent as those incurred in American, but 
Chinese stock market and real estate were still struck. The share prices dropped 
dramatically, the rate of unemployment rose and the buying power of customers 
decreased. Chinese economy fell into the downturn. 
 
Previous studies investigated bank efficiency during financial crisis like the Asian 
financial crisis, transition period or economic reforms like accession WTO (e.g. Park 
and Weber, 2006; Thoraneenitiyan & Avkiran, 2009; Ataullah & Le, 2006). We use a 
more comprehensive and recent data to capture the last time financial crisis and to 
cover the typical commercial banks in China. In this paper, we explore the cost and 
profit efficiency using a non-parametric approach called Data Envelop Analysis (DEA) 
and Tobit regression. The sample data is an unbalanced panel data of 69 Chinese 
commercial banks which are divided into four groups over the period of 2003-2010.  
 
Our objective is to test whether the financial crisis has adversely affected the Chinese 
banking system and whether efficiency has effectively materialized in this system. 
First, we analyze the trend of overall efficiency for each bank type pre- and post-crisis 
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and compare the different efficiency estimations and the efficiency scores of 
different bank ownership. Second, we give out several hypotheses regarding the 
potential determinants of Chinese banking efficiency and the possible relationship 
between bank efficiency and each determinant. The results are compared to the 
previous hypotheses and empirical researches. Some arguments are reasonably 
obtained to explain the results considering the existing circumstances of Chinese 
banking system.  
This paper has some distinguishing features. First, our study takes both cost and 
profit efficiency into account using DEA approach instead of employing Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) and unlike the prior literature which has a typically small 
number of banks in the sample. Second, it extends the studies of Maudos & Pastor 
(2003) and Ariff & Can (2008) which analyze cost and profit efficiency in Spanish and 
Chinese banking sectors respectively, but differs in the sample size, input and output 
variable selections, and regression dependent variable confirmation. Third, we only 
consider the domestic commercial banks and exclude foreign banks and other 
financial institutions like trust investment and cooperative companies. Hence, 
homogenization of specialization is achieved. Finally, this paper tests the effects of 
many factors, namely profitability, ownership, size, risk profile and environment 
changes, using Tobit regression in the second stage. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the review of Chinese banking 
system and the reform during the recent decades. Section 3 describes the literature 
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review which focuses on the bank applications. Section 4 explains the methodology 
about the non-parametric approach, DEA models and the efficiency estimations. 
Section 5 is about the description of sample data, the selection of input and output 
variables, and the regression hypotheses. Section 6 displays the results and findings. 
The conclusions are presented in the last section. 
 
2.  Chinese Banking system 
2.1. Banking reforms 
The process of bank reforms in China has experienced several stages to transfer the 
state-owned ownership to the mixed ownership which were covered in many studies 
(e.g. Chen et al., 2005; Lin & Zhang, 2009; Yin et al., 2010). According to Tang (2005), 
we divide the reform into four stages.  
 
In the first stage (1979-1984) which is called the initial institutional restructuring 
period, ƚŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂŶŬŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?W ) ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂůƐŽŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůďĂŶŬĂŶĚ
its main objectives are maintaining price stability and executing supervisions on 
financial institutions, stripped its commercial banking off and established four 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCB). The four banks had distinct functions over 
different fields covering agriculture, construction, industry and commerce. The 
worked well as monopolistic institutions and had no incentives to compete with 
regional banking sectors. Additionally, the four state-owned banks operate for state 
government and their main business was to offer funds to state-owned enterprises. 
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That is to say, they had no right to make lending decisions based on commercial 
analysis and economic environment.  
 
The second stage (1984-1994) is a deepening period for institutional restructuring. 
The primary mission of the reform is to transform the banking system to be 
market-oriented instead of a policy-driven one. In order to encourage competitions 
in banking system, the government relaxed limitations on the state-owned banks and 
permitted foreign banks and some new domestic banks to enter the financial market. 
Under this circumstance, the joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB), which operated for 
profit maximization, and the rural commercial banks (RCB), which aimed to finance 
small and medium-sized enterprises, were set up to diversify the banking system. As 
a result, the mono bank type was transformed into the system which was dominated 
by the state-owned banks with JSCBs and RCBs followed. Importantly, Wong & Wong 
(2001) pointed out that in this period the SOCBs were intervened by governments 
and extended loans blindly which may incur a large amount of non-performing loans.  
 
The third stage (1994-2003) is called banking commercialization period. In this period 
the effort to reform banking and financial services accelerated especially when Asian 
financial crisis happened in 1998 and China joined WTO in 2001. In 1994 the newly 
established policy banks took the policy lending operation away from the SOCBs. 
Moreover, 112 city commercial banks (CCB) were also founded. Meanwhile, the 
central bank injected capital to offset the non-performing loans of the SOCBs. It is 
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undeniable that this stage was very important because the legislation and 
supervisory regime started to be developed, and financial restructuring and 
liberalization were also in progress. However, there were still many problems needed 
to be settled in the banking system. For instance, the asset quality was poor; liquidity 
and profitability were low; no systematical risk management was complemented. The 
reform was far from accomplishment.  
 
The last stage started from year 2003 and went until now. The core objective of this 
period is partial privatization and modernization. Two strategies were employed to 
restructuring, the one is foreign investment strategy, and the other one is IPO 
strategy. During 2005 and early 2006, three state-owned banks proposed to accept 
partially privatize and take on minority foreign ownership. The project was 
completed in 2006. Moreover, foreign investors were encouraged to take equity in 
domestic banks and finally the foreign investment covered all types of domestic 
banks. For example, Newbridge Financial held 15% of Shenzhen Development Bank, 
Citicorp owned 5% of Pudong Development Bank, and Bank of America, Goldman 
Sachs, Temasek of Singapore and Royal Bank of Scotland all acquired stakes in the 
SOCBs. Apart from foreign investment, these banks went public to allow some shares 
to be traded. Obviously, the two strategies were intimately related because foreign 
investment promoted banks to go public and the benefits brought were increase in 
investor liquidity, improvement in transparency and accuracy of financial 
performances, and regularized market management. After adopting practical reform 
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measurements, the banking system became more comprehensive and multi-layered.  
 
Generally, many achievements and improvements like strategic alliance with foreign 
financial investment, expansion of bank scale, establishment of internal risk 
management systems, increasing the autonomy of banks to make business decisions, 
encouraging competitions and diversifying the bank ownership structures, were 
completed during these reform stages. However, the ultimate success is subject to 
many factors. It is still uncertain whether the SOCBs can make effective operation 
decisions based on economic environment, whether the government intervention 
will make less power and can be reversed in the near future (Dobson & Kashyap, 
2006), whether the SOCBs can efficiently implement risk management and credit 
rating analysis, and whether the problem of non-performing loans can be solved 
properly. We predict that the transformation in the SOCBs are more complicated and 
still take longer to enforce.  
 
2.2. Banking regulatory 
At present, the Chinese financial system is consisted of two regulatory institutions 
ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƉĂƌƚ ? dŚĞ WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ĂŶŬ ŽĨ ŚŝŶĂ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ďĂŶŬ ? ƉůĂǇƐ Ă
dominant and leading role in the system. The responsibilities of the central bank are 
same like that of the Federal Reserve Bank in America. To be more specific, the 
central bank is responsible for executing national monetary policy, supervising the 
credit market including the inter-bank loans, regulating and controlling the interest 
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rate for loans and deposits, managing foreign exchange market and gold reserves, 
and also monitoring and promoting the bond market. Decisions about the 
government intervention are transmitted down through the central bank and these 
decisions are made based on the national economic development and stability. 
 
Another important regulatory institution is the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) which was established by the State Council in 2003. By the 
nature of the commission, the CBRC is the primary government organization which 
also works as a central pivot between the government mechanism and the 
commercial banks. Hence, the commission is responsible for the surveillance on the 
ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ďĂŶŬƐ ? ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ, approving and empowering the establishment, 
restructuring and dissolving of the commercial banks, and most importantly 
formulating principles and laws such as the Commercial Bank Law (launched in 1995) 
and Bank Operation Practices. After China joined the WTO, the rapid growth of the 
national economy acquired the establishment of the CBRC to protect the interest of 
investors and maintain market confidence. Therefore, the standardized regulatory 
makes sense to keep the banking system in order.  
 
2.3. Banking types 
Until now, the Chinese bank ownerships are various and different types of 
commercial banks are competing in the financial market. In 2010, the banking system 
was composed of more than 30,000 institutions including 5 state-owned commercial 
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banks (SOCBs), 12 joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), 120 city commercial banks 
(CCBs), 65 rural commercial banks (RCBs), 31 rural commercial and cooperative banks, 
27 rural credit cooperatives, 86 three types new rural financial institutions, 75 foreign 
banks, 31 trust and investment companies, 45 finance companies, 8 financial leasing 
companies, 7 automobile financing companies, 3 monetary and financial companies, 
and 2 consumer financing companies. The two main groups are the SOCBs and JSCBs 
which took up about 70% of the total assets. As the PBC, the CBRC and the policy 
banks mainly serve special objectives, so we do not contain these banks into our 
categories. 
 
State-owned commercial banks: There are currently five SOCBs, namely the 
Agriculture Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of Communications. The SOCBs 
make efforts to carry out the social welfare objectives. Their branches expand across 
the nation and overseas and the employees were more than 700,000 (Garcia-Herrero 
et al., 2006). As the reform deepened, The SOCBs were also forced to abandon their 
practice on job protection and to improve efficiency through consolidation. in terms 
of total assets, the SOCBs have lost market share over recent years, their shares on 
assets, loans and deposits dropped significantly. In 2005, the shares were 56.1%, 50.1% 
and 79.9% respectively (Yin et al., 2010). Moreover, the non-performing loans ratio, 
which was a big problem for the SOCBs, dropped down to about 6% in 2007 but still 
needs improvement. However, regardless of the decline, they have still dominated in 
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the deposit and loan market for almost two decades and this leading position 
remains unshakable. Such a dominant position comes from some political and 
historical reasons and the vast banking infrastructure as well. 
 
Joint-stock commercial banks: The JSCBs are partially owned by foreign capital, local 
governments, national enterprises and the private sectors. By comparison, the JOCBs 
are much smaller than the SOCBs in the aspect of branch networks, assets and 
operation scales and their main services are set in medium-sized and large cities to 
offer retail and wholesale business. The twelve JSCBs are China Bohai Bank, China 
Minsheng Banking Corporation, China CITIC Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank, China Merchants Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Hua Xia Bank, 
Shenzhen Development Bank, Evergrowing Bank, Industrial Bank, China Everbright 
Bank, and China Zheshang Bank. Specially, the JSCBs diversified their businesses from 
retail banking services to providing foreign exchange and international transaction 
services. The JSCBs took years to expand activities and have captured the partial 
market shares of the SOCBs based on their open and market-oriented culture. 
However, because of the economic development imbalances, the operations of the 
JSCBs are still confined to their locality.  
 
City commercial banks: Compared to the SOCBs and JSCBs, the CCBs are a small 
section of the Chinese banking system but also play an essential part. The assets of 
the CCBs accounted for 6% of the overall assets in 2006 (Sufian & Habibullah, 2012). 
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These banks are owned by local government and local enterprises. They offer 
commercial banking services like intermediary, settlements and money transfers. 
Their main customers are basically small and medium sized enterprises and residents, 
and the CCBs have the advantage of maintaining a strong relationship with local 
business alliances and resident customers. In turn, the advantage also acts as a 
disadvantage. As the CCBs cannot operate at the national level, they still have 
difficulties to attract the customers with large scales and are constrained to the 
locality. 
 
Rural commercial banks: Their operation model is the same with that of the JSCBs 
but they locate in rural areas. The RCBs are owned by farmers, rural enterprises and 
other economic organizations of local financial institutions. The banks provide 
services to farmers and agriculture businesses. 
 
2.4. Financial crisis 
In all, the global financial crisis which derived from the 2007 subprime crisis to a 
certain degree affected the Chinese banking system in a short term but will impact 
significantly in the long term. In particular, the global financial crisis brought 
unfavorable effects on the Chinese banking system mainly through three ways. 
 
First, under the financial crisis, the impacts on Chinese real economy reduced the 
profitability and worsened the performance of the enterprises. Meanwhile, the 
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buying powers of foreign customers declined and in turn affected export to decrease. 
Some industrial enterprises and export corporations had difficulties to obtain profits 
to repay the loans and interests. So this would cause higher ratios of bad assets and 
non-performing loans. 
 
Second, the global economy went into the period of cutting interest rate and the 
Chinese commercial banks confronted with high exchange rate risk and interest risks. 
The sales of financial products as well as traditional deposit and loan business have 
been affected, and the profit margins shrunk considerably resulted from the business 
decline.   
 
Third, some foreign countries like the US and European countries increased the 
demand for capital and funds but reduced the supply. This resulted in the reduction 
of foreign capital inflow to China. The negative impact on banking sectors could be 
proved by the evidence that foreign investors sold out the equity of Chinese banks. 
 
In order to cope with the adverse effects, Chinese banking sectors should improve all 
around and concentrate on four aspects. First, in the subprime crisis, the financial 
and rating institutions violated the principles of integrity and failed to disclosure the 
true credit information about loan terms and interest rate risk which would mislead 
customers. Commercial banks should collect credit records of individuals or 
institutions and create more stringent credit evaluation system to reduce credit 
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liquidity risk.  
 
Second, currently the main profit source of the domestic banking sectors is still the 
traditional business like loans and deposits. As the banks over dependent on the 
mono profit model, the trend to cut down profit is inevitable. Hence, it is important 
to make adjustments such as business integration, market segmentation, financial 
product innovation and technology development. 
 
Third, agency problem and moral hazard are the cause of the outbreak of the 
subprime crisis. In order to protect the interests of customers, the bank managers 
should be appropriately motivated like wages, benefits or incentive stock options, 
and also be constrained by institutional, contracts or market constraints. Most 
important, risk management should play the key role to fight against the financial 
crisis. 
 
Forth, market regulation cannot do everything, so government and relevant 
institutions should concern about the development of the financial markets to 
supervise the entire banking system and to avoid the risks of financial derivatives and 
market disorder.  
 
3.  Literature Review 
ƐƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚǀŝĞǁƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞďĂŶŬ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůŐŽĂů ŝƐƚŽŵĂǆŝŵŝǌĞƚŚĞ
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ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? ǀĂůƵĞ ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ &ƌĂƐĞƌ  ? &ƌĂƐĞƌ  ?1990), two dimensions of bank 
performance underlying the principal are profitability, efficiency and risk, that is, all 
managerial decision would generate impacts on profitability, efficiency and risk. 
Therefore, Avikiran (2006) summarized the risk-return framework which highlighted 
the responsibility of management for striking well balance between risk and return. 
This suggested that the analysis of bank performance should include these 
profitability, efficiency and risk dimensions. 
 
3.1. Applications of Data Envelop Analysis (DEA) in banking  
According to Huang & Wang (2002 ) ?  ‘ ‘dŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ ƵƐĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐ ŽĨ ďĂŶŬ
performance or efficiency are the accounting ratios and efficiency scores obtained 
ĨƌŽŵ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ? ? ? ^ŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
data envelopment analysis (DEA), arguably the most widely used frontier efficiency 
technique first popularized by Charnes et al. (1978) are in the banking sector. As a 
result, DEA is a well-established relative efficiency analysis technique in banking. 
 
There were massive of studies using DEA approaches over different countries. Miller 
& Noulas (1996) tested the overall efficiency and had the conclusion that the 
technical efficiency of overall American banks was about 97% (could be also showed 
as 0.97) which got very close to score 1 and represented a very high level of efficiency. 
About large American banks, Meanwhile, Seiford & Zhu (1999) took further steps and 
a two-stage DEA approach. Unlike the overall evaluation of US large banks conducted 
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by Miller & Noulas, they selected top 55 US banks and resulted that large banks had 
more probabilities to have higher profitability while small banks may have lower 
profitability but better marketability respectively and summarized that bank 
efficiency was positively related to bank size and profitability. Al-Shammari & Salimi 
(1998) examined Jordan banks and computed operation efficiency by employing a 
modified DEA. The results indicated that the large number of banks surveyed in the 
sample were fairly inefficient over the period of 1991 to 1994.  
 
Some studies chose to exam the efficiency of bank branches. Al-Faraj et al. (1993) 
just concentrated one largest commercial bank in Saudi Arabia and used DEA to 
evaluate. Among 15 branches, 12 branches have scores around 1 which could be 
identified to be efficient. Moreover, Alirezaee et al (1998) also applied DEA numerical 
experiments and gathered large-sized sample data. They emphasized 1282 Canadian 
bank branches and concluded that most braches showed high efficient but some 
inefficiencies were due to location or market.  
 
When incorporated comparison, several studies committed to find out whether there 
was improvement in bank efficiency after the special period like financial crisis. Zaim 
(1995) concluded that Turkish banks experienced improvement in efficiency in 1981 
under a more liberalized banking environment after financial reforms and this 
improvement in cost efficiency mainly showed on technical and allocative efficiency 
components. Casu and Molyneux (2003) utilized a bootstrapping DEA technique to 
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conclude that the bank efficiency of European banking systems was investigated has 
revealed Ă ƐůŝŐŚƚ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ ^ŝŶŐůĞ DĂƌŬĞƚ
Program. Baer and Nazmi (2000) wanted to verify whether the implementation of 
newly modified bank structure has exerted positive influence to alleviate the 
negative impacts of the financial crises in Brazil caused by the constant inflation and 
the implications of the newly emerging bank structure. As a result, the test showed 
that after crisis banking industry was still inefficient.  
 
Most important, various possible factors related to bank efficiency were taken into 
account in some studies. Recent development in the application of DEA 
demonstrates that the kind of analysis can not only determine bank efficiency scores 
over a certain periods, but also explore the impacts of contextual or environmental 
factors on the bank efficiency scores. As to Turkish commercial banks, Yildirim (2002) 
detected efficiency from 1988 to 1999 and Sakar (2006) focused on the period from 
2002 to 2005. The result concluded from Sakar showed that the bank efficiency had 
significant relationships with branch numbers, staff numbers and market shares. The 
banks with less than 200 or with about 600 branches, with less than 5000 staff or 
around 9000 staff and with 3% market share of total assets or more than 11% market 
share had better scale efficiency, while around 9% market share around may show 
lower efficiency level. However, marketing competition and effective bank ownership 
could increase efficiency.  
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In addition, some scholars concentrated on the 1998 Asian financial crisis and 
dedicated to finding out the factors which might affect bank efficiency in crisis. Park 
& Weber (2006) studied Korean bank efficiency and productivity change. Under the 
circumstances of financial liberalization and the Asian financial crisis, they gave the 
conclusion that technical evolution and bank reforms were very significant 
determinants to improve bank efficiency and generate rapid growth. Apart from the 
DEA approach, Thoraneenitiyan & Avkiran (2009) utilized the slacks based measure 
(SBM). Their purpose was to identify the relationship between bank structure, 
country-specific conditions and bank efficiency in Asian countries after Asian 
financial crisis from 1997 to 2001. The important factor related to bank structure was 
the bank ownership. They found that banks acquisition and restructuring did not 
result in higher bank efficiency. As to the determinants to efficiency declination, they 
concluded that country-specific contexts like fluctuated interest rate and 
macroeconomic developments, which were same as the study of Park & Weber 
(2006), most attributed bank inefficiency.  
 
According to Thoraneenitiyan & Avkiran (2009), there are several reasons for scholars 
to study bank efficiency and respective determinants post crisis. First is the district 
importance considering many financial factors, such as financial acquisition, the 
direction of capital flows to the financial markets, and macroeconomic reforms. 
Second, it is claimed that the banking crises are mainly caused by bank inefficiency in 
developing countries. After 1997 the East Asian crisis and 2007-2009 subprime crisis, 
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the bank regulation institutions of crisis-stroke countries like US, European countries 
and some Asian countries complemented banking system reforms and other practical 
methods to enhance bank efficiency and reduce failure risk and inefficiency by merge 
and acquisition. Finally, many studies contributed to investigate environmental 
factors which influenced bank efficiency estimation.  
 
However, based on the previous researches the influence of environmental factors is 
limited to studies on European banking sectors. Under the examination of the 
cross-country bank efficiency, country-specific conditions played an important role to 
measure bank efficiency in developing countries. These investigations on bank 
efficiency of banking system show the trend that the focus of studies extended from 
the calculations on overall bank efficiency to estimations on more specific branch 
efficiency and identifications on factors which have the relationship with bank 
efficiency under a special economic environment.  
 
3.2. Bank ownership and bank efficiency 
In terms of the relationship between bank ownership type and bank efficiency, 
different types of bank ownership types may have different impacts on bank 
efficiency. A large number of studies examined these differences across or within 
countries.  
 
Berger et al. (2009) compare the cost and profit efficiencies of different bank 
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ownership groups (the Big Four state-owned banks, non-Big Four state-owned banks, 
majority private domestic banks, majority foreign banks and no majority ownership 
banks), using a sample of 38 banks between 1994 and 2003. Berger et al. (2004) 
chose 28 developing nations to test bank efficiency, and Bonin et al. (2005) focused 
on Eastern European banks, while Delfino (2003) and Berger et al. (2005) investigated 
Argentine banks. All the studies above found that foreign banks are more efficient 
than domestic private banks, while these two types of banks are also more efficient 
than the state-owned banks. 
 
In a study of Indian banks, Bhattacharya et al. (1997) found out that the state-owned 
banks were the most efficient banks compared to foreign and domestic private banks 
although the difference between state-owned banks and foreign banks was not much. 
When going into details, public banks have the highest average efficiency and the 
lowest variance on efficiency, while foreign-owned and domestic private banks had 
lower average efficiency. At the first stage of the study, the efficiency of 
foreign-owned banks remained ate the lowest level. At the last stage of study and 
during the last two years, foreign-owned banks efficiency grew up rapidly. Sensarma 
(2006) also found lower efficiency levels for foreign banks in India during the 
deregulation period. Moreover, in case of comparing Indian public banks and private 
domestic banks, Sathye (2003) showed that public banks are more efficient.  
 
Cadet et al. (2008) supported the conclusions of Indian studies and reached a same 
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result in Haiti. However, Havrylchyk (2006) and Sturm & Williams (2004) used the 
DEA technique to explore the Polish and Australian banking industry respectively and 
the result was indicated different with the studies on India banks which mentioned 
above and showed that foreign banks are more efficient. Similarly, Bonin et al. (2005) 
and Staikouras et al. (2007) concluded that foreign banks are more efficient than 
domestic banks in transition countries and in South Eastern European region 
respectively. Both studies considered the specific economic environment and 
development.  
 
Actually, there are mixed result to define whether foreign, public or domestic banks 
would be more efficient because the results are determined by a variety of factors. 
Garcia-Cestona & Surroca (2008) pointed out different goals for different bank types 
attributed different results. For instance, profit making purpose may not be the most 
important one for public banks because other businesses like regional development 
may considered in decision making process.  
 
As to China, there are five main types of Chinese banks which are state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs), joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs), city commercial 
banks (CCBs), policy banks (PBs) and rural commercial banks (RCBs). Chen et al. (2005) 
ŐĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  “ďŝŐ ĨŽƵƌ ? ŵĂũŽƌ ^KƐŝŶ ŚŝŶĂ ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽƐƚ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ
comparing to smaller JSCBs. However, Wei & Wang (2000) and Zhong et al. (2001) 
employed X-efficiency model to study Chinese banks. These researches concluded 
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that state-owned banks had a low level of bank efficiency. Meanwhile, Matthews et 
al. (2009) also indicated that JSCBs commonly display a better performance than 
SOCBs, and pointed out that the SOCBs show no productivity growth because the 
offset between technological progress and efficiency regression. Fu & Heffernan 
(2005) examined the cost X-efficiency of 14 Chinese banks during 1985 W2002 and 
enhanced the conclusion of Wei et al that the SOCBs were less efficient than the 
JSCBs. Berger et al. (2006) applied SFA approach to evaluate cost and profit efficiency 
of Chinese commercial banks and also illustrated a lower efficiency level of the SOCBs 
than that of other bank types. Moreover, there was an increased trend for higher 
efficiency in foreign commercial banks.  
 
In summary, among these studies the most common finding for developing countries 
is that in general the foreign banks are more efficient than or have the same level of 
efficiency with the domestic private banks. State-owned banks perform on average 
the lowest bank efficiency.  
 
3.3. Risk factors and bank efficiency 
Apart from studies on bank efficiency alone, more and more studies try to explore 
the relationship between bank profitability, risks and efficiency mostly using Tobit 
regression. Li et al. (2001) estimated profit equation by two-stage least square and 
measured profit which was represented by net income to assets using unexpected 
variation in market deposit, standard deviation of average capital income and 
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unexpected variation of loans.  
 
On the other hand, the risk was measured by the standard deviation of net income to 
assets which may affected by market concentration and market power. Sinkey (2002) 
broke down bank performance into return, which was measured by ROE, and risk, 
which was presented by variability of ROE. In some banks report ROE was clearly 
computed but in other banks equity multiplier and ROA would be needed to come to 
ROE. In this study, capitalization was considered as potential risk exposure, and ROA, 
the profitability measurement, was determined by controllable factors and 
non-controllable factors. Sinkey further defined controllable factors to be turnover, 
loan quality, liquidity and capital management, while non-controllable factors were 
set as inflation, regulatory, market demand and district development. The underlying 
idea in the study was that this risk Wreturn framework is consistent with the 
value-maximization framework.  
 
Sufian (2009) investigated the efficiency of Malaysian banking sector through the 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach around the Asian financial crisis 1997. 
After the efficiency estimation, the analysis further focused on the determinants 
which may have impacts on the bank efficiency. He adopted multivariate Tobit 
regression to test the relationship between Malaysian bank efficiency and the bank 
specific and macroeconomic and contained a set of explanatory variables like bank 
size, profitability, and ownership.  
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According to Ariff & Can (2006), in the first stage they combined cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency to analyze Chinese banking system implementing DEA the 
non-parametric techniques. In the second stage, they also used Tobit regression to 
examine whether ownership structure, bank size, credit risk, asset quality, capital risk, 
liquidity risk, profitability, operating costs and crisis the environmental factor.  
 
Additionally, Ataullah & Le (2006) ran regression and implied that external factors 
were considered to be significant to bank efficiency. The external factors mainly 
included the competition intensity, growth in demand for financial services, and 
government regulations. Drake et al. (2006) applied non-parametric approach to 
assess the relative technical efficiency of Hong Kong banking sectors. The first stage 
was efficiency estimation, and the second stage is Tobit regression to analyze the 
impact of environmental variables such as macro economy and regulatory. 
 
4.  Methodology  
This paper uses data envelopment analysis (DEA), the non-parametric method, to 
analyze the bank efficiency in the first stage. Specifically, the bank efficiency is 
measured by both cost efficiency and profit efficiency. In the second stage, we use 
Tobit regression to assess whether some important variables including risk factors 
like credit risk, capital risk and liquidity risk commitments significantly affect bank 
efficiency.  
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There are several reasons for us to complete two-stage study. First, the underlying 
efficiency has two aspects. Cost efficiency aims to achieve the minimization of costs, 
while profit efficiency takes the goal of profit maximization into account. Our study 
combines these two aspects of bank efficiency to gain a more comprehensive result.  
 
Second, many existing researches of China have adopted stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA), the parametric method, to assess bank efficiency. However, DEA does not 
make assumptions about functional forms and works well with a small sample size, 
and has advantages of accommodation a multiplicity of outputs and inputs. 
Therefore, this paper would examine whether the result is consistent with that of 
using parametric approach.  
 
Finally, besides testing the bank efficiency level, the determinants especially risk 
factors play roles to this efficiency level are also very important. Some authors have 
utilized censored Tobit regression (e.g. Casu & Molyneux, 2003; Maudos et al., 2002). 
It is obvious that Tobit regression integrates the censored nature of the dependent 
variable and generates consistent estimations. According to the scale score, we adopt 
Tobit regression with a left censored bound of zero and right censored bound of one 
to regress the bank efficiency and determine the factors of bank specific and 
economic environment variables. 
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4.1. Data Envelop Analysis (DEA) 
4.1.1. Introduction to DEA 
Schaffnit (1997) defined Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) a theoretically sound 
framework for performance analysis that offers many advantages over traditional 
methods such as performance financial ratios and regression analysis. A set of 
entities, often called decision-making units (DMUs), mainly inquire the DEA and then 
receive inputs and produce multiple outputs. Samoilenko & Osei-Bryson (2008) 
pointed out the purpose of DEA is to establish the relative efficiency of each DMU 
within a sample and the most significant function of DEA is to evaluate the operating 
performance of a group of decision making units (DMUs) and the interaction 
performance efficiency.  
 
It is obvious that the DEA can process multiple inputs and outputs simultaneously, Lin 
et al. (2009) also illustrate that the efficiency frontier obtained after interaction is the 
combination line of most favorable circumstances of evaluated units. Regarding the 
efficiency frontier, Farrell (1957) proposed to adopt this so-called efficiency frontier 
to measure ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?  ‘ ‘WƌĞƐĞƚ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝƐ ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ ƵƐĞĚ ?
ďƵƚ ŚĞ ƵƐĞĚ  ‘ ‘ŶŽŶ-ƉƌĞƐĞƚ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ Ăůů
decision-making units (DMUs) as one identical production function. Then a best 
practice group is established by using piece-wise to connect the best practice DMU 
points to form an enveloping curve or efficiency frontier. Other DMU points which 
are not on this efficiency frontier are identified to be inefficient. In other words, DEA 
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allows improvements and the magnitude of the inefficiencies for the inefficient units.  
 
Basically, as Avkiran (2011) illustrated, in this linear programming each DMU uses 
linear program to scale the relative efficiency which estimated between 0 and 1. By 
comparing the final result, a DMU with 1 score represents an efficient performance 
in the sample, and with score less than 1 is considered to be inefficient performance.  
 
Moreover, there are two quite different objectives in making assessments of 
efficiency. Avkiran (2011) clearly redefined this measurement as input-orientation 
and output-orientation. Under input-orientation, the objective is to estimate how 
much the inputs can be controlled while maintaining the existing number of outputs. 
Alternatively, under output-orientation, the objective is to expand the number of 
ŽƵƚƉƵƚƐĨŽƌŐŝǀĞŶůĞǀĞůƐŽĨ ŝŶƉƵƚƐ ?dŽƐƵŵƵƉ ? “ŝƐďĞƐƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ŶĞǁǁĂǇŽĨǀŝƐƵĂůŝǌŝŶŐĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇǌŝŶŐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĚĂƚĂ ? ? ?DĂŶƐŽƵƌǇ ?^ĂůĞŚŝ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 
DEA technique has some advantages over other methods. First, Avkiran (2011) 
pointed out that there is no preconceived structure and explicitly specify a 
mathematical form imposed on the data to create the production function. The idea 
underlying the assumption is that the bank efficiency can be measured based on the 
actual observed performance in the sample. As we mentioned above, DEA, the 
efficient frontier technique, identifies the inefficiency through comparing the 
particular DMU to the similar DMUs which are benchmarked to be efficient. This kind 
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of technique avoids getting some data like statistical average value of DMU 
performance which may be inapplicable.  
 
Second, the result reported from DEA allows various potential improvements in input 
utilization and output generation. To be more specific, the technique takes different 
models like return to scale into account to calculate efficiency. This concept indicates 
that it is possible to increase or decrease efficiency under the given levels of size and 
production. Hence, from this aspect DEA plays an important role to work as a 
valuable benchmarking tool.  
 
Finally, DEA has a strong capability of accommodating a multiplicity of inputs and 
outputs. That is to say, the interaction among multiple inputs and outputs can be 
captured in a scalar value. It is obvious that this ability of processing input and output 
variables is superior to traditional ratio analysis.  
 
However, the limitation of DEA is also distinct. As the assumption of data fails to 
contain the measurement error, Berg (2009) suggested that the design of model, and 
inclusion or exclusion of variables can affect the results. Thus, compared with 
parametric techniques, DEA is more sensitive to the existence of measurement error. 
So in our study we will choose appropriate input and output variables with more 
considerations.  
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4.1.2. Efficiency estimations 
The general concept of efficiency comes from the difference comparison between 
observed and benchmark, which can be also seen as optimal, combination values of 
inputs and outputs. As DEA is the frontier where the set of efficient observations on, 
this means that on this frontier there are no other linear combinations which can 
adopt less inputs without changing the outputs amount or can produce more 
outputs without increasing the quantities of input employed.  According to different 
efficiency levels of input utilization and output generation, there are a number of 
efficiency concepts and measurements like X-efficiency, economic efficiency, cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency.  
 
According to Wu et al. (2006), DEA basically allows us to focus on the input saving 
which can be also known as cost efficiency (CE) and on the output maximization 
which is profit efficiency (PE). Cost efficiency (CE) can be detailed into two 
components, the allocative efficiency (AE) and technical efficiency (TE). The AE, as 
Isik & Hassan (2002) defined, measures the proportional reduction in costs if the 
bank chooses the right mix of inputs given the prices (the point of tangency between 
the isoquant and budget line), and TE measures the proportional reduction in input 
usage that can be attained if the bank operates on the efficient frontier. Thus, if the 
banks are cost efficient, that means the banks are both allocatively and technically 
efficient. As to X-efficiency, the concepts of it were firstly introduced by Leibenstein 
(1966) and Kyj & Isik (2008) defined X-efficiency scores calculated by DEA are the 
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differences about input utilizations between the observed bank and the estimated 
efficient frontier. As the input-orientation and output-orientation are two different 
objectives of efficiency assessments, the non-frontier scale or scope efficiency is 
output-orientation and concerns the choices of outputs, while X-efficiency features 
on the input usages. 
 
Under non-parametric methods, for instance, Maudos & Pastor (2003), Färe et al. 
(2004), Chen et al. (2005), Ariff & Can (2008), Revanian et al. (2011) all chose to 
examine cost efficiency and/or profit efficiency. To be more specific, there was a little 
difference among these studies. Maudos & Pastor (2003) examined Spanish bank 
efficiency during 1985 and 1996 by adopting alternative profit efficiency and 
compared it with cost efficiency. On the other hand, Färe et al. (2004) set standard 
profit efficiency as computing model to investigate US commercial banks from 1990 
to 1994. While Chen et al. (2005) just focused on cost efficiency using the data 
sample of 43 Chinese banks from 1993 to 2000. In our study, cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency measurements will be well combined to obtain the bank efficiency 
level. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) offers a range of models for the efficiency 
assessment of decision making units (DMUs).  
 
Regarding the nature of returns to scale of the production technology and the 
problem based on whether correspondingly proportional change of all inputs and 
outputs is reasonable, there are the constant returns-to-scale (CRS) model, proposed 
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by Charnes et al (1978), which is also known as the CCR model, and the variable 
returns-to-scale (VRS) model, introduced by Banker et al (1984), which also known as 
the BCC model. Specifically, the term returns to scale arises in the context of a firm's 
production function. It denotes changes like increase by a constant factor in all inputs 
are resulted in a proportional change in outputs. CRS model shows the 
simultaneously proportional in output and this is the standard to distinguish the VRS 
model. Charnes et al (1978) pointed out that the CRS model estimates the gross 
efficiency of a DMU. This efficiency comprises technical efficiency and scale efficiency. 
While VRS measures the pure technical efficiency. It is very important to choose an 
appropriate model specification. In our study, we choose CRS model to control the 
multiplicity of size in the sample under the assumption that the production function 
has constant returns over that range.  
 
4.2. Stage 1: Efficiency estimations using non-parametric DEA methodology 
4.2.1. Cost efficiency (CE) 
Under the input orientation, cost efficiency weights how minimum the cost which is 
inputs number multiples the given inputs prices would generate the same amount of 
outputs at certain prices. Assume that there are ܰሺ݇ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ሻܰ banks which have a 
vector of n inputs ݔ௞ ൌ ሺݔ௞ଵǡ ǥ Ǥ ݔ௞௡ሻ at price of ݓ௞ ൌ ሺݓ௞ଵǡ ǥ Ǥ ݓ௞௡ሻ and produce 
a vector of m outputs ݕ௞ ൌ ሺݕ௞ଵǡ ǥ Ǥ ݕ௞௡ሻ  for given market prices ݒ௞ ൌ ሺݒ௞ଵǡ ǥ Ǥ ݒ௞௡ሻ. For a bank݅, the cost efficiency can be showed in a linear 
programming as follows: 
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Min   ? ݔ௜௡௡ ݓ௜௡ 
s.t.   ? ߣ௞௞ ݔ௞௡ ൑  ݔ௜௡  
      ? ߣ௞௞ ݕ௞௠ ൒  ݕ௜௠ 
      ? ߣ௞௞ ൌ  ?Ǣߣ௞ ൒  ?Ǣ ݇ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ Ǥ  ܰ
     ׊݊ǡ ׊݉ǡݔ௞ǡ ݓ௞  א ܴ௡ାାǡ ݕ௞ǡ ݒ௞  א ܴ௠ାା 
Where ݓ௜ is a vector of input prices, ݕ௜ is a vector of outputs produced by bank݅, ݕ௞௠ is a matrix of observed outputs produced by all banks in the sample and ݔ௞௡ is 
a matrix of observed inputs employed by all banks in the sample and ߣ௞ is an 
intensity vector. ݔ௜כ ൌ ሺݔ௜ଵכ ǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݔ௜௡כ ሻ is obtained from a linear combination of banks 
which corresponds to the goal of input costs minimization at given inputs prices. The 
banks should generate at least as much outputs as bank݅ does utilizing the same 
numbers or less numbers of inputs. When coming to the cost efficiency, the potential 
minimum cost of the hypothetical bank has a cost ܥ௜כ ൌ  ? ݔ௜௡כ௡ ݓ௜௡ , and ܥ௜ ൌ ? ݔ௜௡௡ ݓ௜௡ is the actual cost incurred by bank݅. In theory, ܥ௜כ should be less than or 
equal to ܥ௜. So the cost efficiency of bank݅ is calculated as follows: 
      ܥܧ௜ ൌ ஼೔כ஼೔ ൌ  ? ௫೔೙כ೙ ௪೔೙ ? ௫೔೙೙ ௪೔೙ 
Where ܥܧ௜ is expressed by the ratio of the minimum costs to the observed costs. 
The interval of cost efficiency is arranged to be (0,1), and the best-performed bank 
has the cost efficiency equals to 1 in the sample. Cost efficiency is defined as an 
equation that the minimum cost incurred by a specific unit of output which is 
determined by the frontier (C*) is divided by the actual cost (C). Hence, the cost 
efficiency value CE=C*/C indicated a underlying note that if there is a cost saving at 
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(1-CE)*100 per cent in actual cost, it would be still possible to generate the same 
units of production. 
 
4.2.2. Standard profit efficiency (SPE) 
Unlike cost efficiency, profit efficiency corresponds to the objective of profit 
maximization. Moreover, according to Chen et al. (2005), profit efficiency shows a 
broader concept than cost efficiency for it considers both the costs and revenue of 
the production. With a specific amount and prices of inputs and outputs, profit 
efficiency measures the certain degree that the profit generated get close to the 
maximum profit level. In terms of the existence of market power in the pricing of 
outputs, as Berger and Mester (1997) illustrated, the profit efficiency can be 
distinguished into two categories: the standard profit efficiency (SPE) and the 
alternate profit efficiency (APE). The SPE set assumptions under the perfect 
competition market that no market power of output and input prices imposed to 
affect. Similar to the cost efficiency, in the case of bank݅, we use the linear 
programming model proposed by Färe & Grosskopf (1997) to express. The model is 
showed as follows: 
      Max   ? ݕ௜௠௠ ݒ௜௠ െ  ? ݔ௜௡௡ ݓ௜௡ 
s.t    ? ߣ௞௞ ݔ௞௡ ൑  ݔ௜௡  
      ? ߣ௞௞ ݕ௞௠ ൒  ݕ௜௠ 
      ? ߣ௞௞ ൌ  ?Ǣߣ௞ ൒  ?Ǣ ݇ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ Ǥ  ܰ
           ׊݊ǡ ׊݉ǡݔ௞ǡ ݓ௞  א ܴ௡ାାǡ ݕ௞ǡ ݒ௞  א ܴ௠ାା 
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This solution to which corresponds to the vector of outputs ݕ௜כ ൌ ሺݕ௜ଵכ ǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݕ௜௠כ ሻ and 
the input demand vector ݔ௜כ ൌ ሺݔ௜ଵכ ǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݔ௜௡כ ሻ which maximize the profits with the 
given prices of outputs ݒ and of inputs ݓ. With the same amount or less amount of 
inputs, the combination of banks that generate as much as or more than the outputs 
of bank݅ would have a profit ௜ܲכ ൌ  ? ݕ௜௠כ௠ ݒ௜௠ െ  ? ݔ௜௡כ௡ ݓ௜௡. As the standard profit 
efficiency is defined as the quotient between observed profit ௜ܲ  and the maximum 
profit ௜ܲכ attainable as determined by the standard profit frontier given the specific 
inputs and outputs prices, ௜ܲכ would be higher than or equal to ௜ܲ. So the standard 
profit efficiency (SPE) for bank݅ can be calculated as follows: 
            ܵܲܧ௜ ൌ ௉೔ௌ௉೔כ ൌ  ? ௬೔೘೘ ௩೔೘ି ? ௫೔೙೙ ௪೔೙ ? ௬೔೘כ೘ ௩೔೘ି ? ௫೔೙כ೙ ௪೔೙ 
Where the standard profit efficiency value SPE=P/SP* suggests that given the input 
and output prices in the market, it would be possible if the firm wants to increase the 
profits by (1-SPE)*100% per cent. However, in the concept of profit efficiency the 
price of the output has some disadvantages because the market power in pricing is 
not taken into account. The market power is the exogenous nature of the output 
price. 
 
4.2.3. Alternative profit efficiency (APE) 
In order to solve the problem of taking no account of market power in pricing, 
alternative profit efficiency is defined, in the case of bank݅, in a linear programming 
as follows: 
      Max  ܴ௜ െ  ? ݔ௜௡௡ ݓ௜௡ 
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      s.t.    ? ߣ௞௞ ܴ௞ ൒  ܴ௜  
    ? ߣ௞௞ ݔ௞௡ ൑  ݔ௜௡ 
            ? ߣ௞௞ ݕ௞௠ ൒  ݕ௜௠ 
      ? ߣ௞௞ ൌ  ?Ǣߣ௞ ൒  ?Ǣ ݇ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ Ǥ  ܰ
           ׊݊ǡ ׊݉ǡݔ௞ǡ ݓ௞  א ܴ௡ାାǡ ݕ௞ǡ ݒ௞  א ܴ௠ାା 
The solution corresponds to the revenue  ܴ௜כ  and the input demand vector ݔ௜כ ൌ ሺݔ௜ଵכ ǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݔ௜௡כ ሻ that maximize profits with the given prices of inputs ݓ. This 
solution is obtained from a linear combination of firms that can utilize the same or 
less amount of inputs to produce at least as much outputs as bank݅ does, and can 
obtain at least as much revenues as bank݅ does. The APE for bank݅ then can be 
calculated as follows: ܣܲܧ௜ ൌ ௜ܲܣ ௜ܲכ ൌ ܴ௜ െ  ? ݔ௜௡௡ ݓ௜௡ ? ܴ௜כ௠ െ  ? ݔ௜௡כ௡ ݓ௜௡ 
Where the value of APE=P/AP* indicates that the firm is likely to increase its profits 
by (1-APE)*100% per cent facing the particular input and output prices. According to 
Berger & Mester (1997), alternative efficiency is closer to the reality and more 
precise when the existence of perfect competition is not uncertain. Under imperfect 
competition, there are differences in output quality among individuals of the sample, 
and there are some problems about information asymmetry when used to compute 
output prices. 
 
We adopt DEA solver which is easy to operate to produce these three efficiency 
measurements.  
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4.3. Stage 2: Tobit regression model 
The DEA efficiency scores obtained in the first stage will be employed as a dependent 
variable for regression in this stage. We will discover what determinants like bank 
specific and environmental factors may have impacts on the efficiency level. As the 
DEA efficiency score falls in the range of (0, 1), so the dependent variable is a limited 
dependent variable. With limited observations, the simple linear regression model is 
not an adequate empirical tool for capturing the relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables. Although OLS regression is 
common and easy to control, it still fails to form a limited dependent variable model 
in many practical situations. Many studies chose alternative regression models like 
censored Tobit regression (for example, Casu & Molyneux, 2003; Drake et al, 2006; 
Sufian, 2009; Sturm & Williams, 2010). This model has two sorts of data and is 
usually used when the dependent variables have the censored nature. We follow 
Coelli et al. (1998) and use censored Tobit regression as well. The Tobit regression 
model designed for bank݅ efficiency determinants can be defined as follows: 
ܧܨܨ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ෍ ߚ௜ܺ௜௡௜ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜ 
Where random error ߝ௜ ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ߪଶሻ , EFF is cost efficiency, standard profit and 
alternative profit efficiency scores, ߚ଴  is constant factor and ߚ௜  is unknown 
parameter respectively, and ܺ௜ is represented by n dependent variables which are 
bank efficiency determinants. And STATA software is utilized.  
 
5.  Data and variables 
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Our data is unbalanced panel data and the major source of our sample data is 
BankScope which covers full information about different countries and offers 
homogenous category of Chinese banks. In the case of missing or questionable 
values, additional data and other supplementary information are acquired from 
sources like bank annual reports, China Banking Regulatory Commission and Yearly 
^ƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐŽŽŬŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ?dŚĞĚĂƚĂĐŽǀers overall 69 Chinese commercial 
banks over the period of 2003 to 2010 which seen the 2007-2008 subprime crisis. 
The worldwide financial crisis is expected to more or less exert some effects on 
Chinese banking system and this period is sufficiently long to cover the whole 
development process of the financial crisis and to assess the bank performance.  
 
Among the 69 commercial banks, we classify these commercial banks into four 
groups: 5 state-owned commercial banks (SOCBS), 11 joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCBS), 52 city commercial banks (CCBS) and 4 rural commercial banks (RCBS). We 
cover the all 5 state-owned banks which take up 71% of total deposits and 80% of 
total fixed asset in 2010 in the sample. There are 12 JSCB banks in China and our 
study contains 11 large banks. They occupy 20.7% deposits, 21.9% loan and 12.7% 
fixed assets in 2010. These banks are partially owned by governments and state but 
private sectors and foreign investment still have a portion. 4 RCBs are selected to 
represent this type of bank. Finally, we have 49 CCBs out of all 120 banks which hold 
over 7% of bank deposits and loans in 2010. These banks were established based on 
the urban credit cooperatives and have relatively small scale of assets which is 
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resulted from geographical restrictions. Policy banks, rural credit cooperatives and 
trust and investment companies are not taken into consideration because these 
banks are not pure commercial banks and the primary business is different from the 
commercial banks. Additionally, solely foreign-owned is neither included for the 
reason that there may some localization restrictions and their business strategies 
may be significantly affected by the parent banks.  
 
In terms of the financial performance which is illustrated in Table 1, larger banks 
generally appear to hold higher ratio of net loans to total assets (NLTA). That is, the 
SOCBs take 51.27% and the JSCBs have 56.26%, while the RCBs and the CCBs hold 
47.66% and 52.8% respectively. Turning to equity to assets (ETA), the situation is 
completely opposite. The CCBs own the highest average equity to assets ratio (5.6%) 
and followed by RCBs with 5%. The SOCBs have the mean ratio of 4.4% which is the 
lowest followed the JSCBƐ ?  ? ? ?A? ? In all, the profitability of the Chinese commercial 
banks is not strong enough. The SOCBs and the CCBs are the most profitable among 
these four groups with ROA 0.86% and 0.84% respectively. However, relatively high 
ROA of the SOCBs is associated with high cost-to-income. Interestingly, the CCBs have 
the lowest ratio of impaired loans to equity (ILE, 36.33%) whereas the SOCBs show 
highest one (122.37%). The reason may be that a large portion of income of the CCBs 
is non-interest income and this kind of income is less risky than interest income 
which may be affected by non-performing loans or impaired loans. Actually, the 
observable trend is also consistent with the calculated result of cost and profit 
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efficiency.  
 
5.1. Input and output selection 
In order to select the most critical subjects in bank balance sheet, we will adopt 
intermediation approach to choose the input and output variables. The 
intermediation, which is also known as the asset approach, and production 
approaches are two commonly used approaches to model a commercial bank. In 
production approach a commercial bank allocates its resources to offer services to 
the customers (Berg et.al, 1991; Berg et.al. 1993; Tulkens & Eeckaut 1995; Shaffnit 
et.al, 1997). While in intermediate approach, commercial banks work as financial 
intermediaries to accumulate and purchase funds between depositors and borrowers. 
Subramanyam & Reddy (2008) clearly distinguished the two approaches that under 
production approach deposits are regarded as output, whereas in intermediate 
approach deposits are considered to have the nature of input.  
 
Before ascertaining the input and output variables, we refers to many similar studies. 
^ŝĞŵƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ďĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞĚŽŶŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?
which means evaluating management quality is an important start point to evaluate 
ĂďĂŶŬ ?ƐĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?,ĞƐĞƚƐŽŵĞĐƌƵĐŝĂůŝŶƉƵƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĨŝǆĞĚ
asset, interest expense, other non-interest expense, full-time staff, salary expense 
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and number of loans, and output variables including asset, total deposit and interest 
revenue. His model gave us a good example.  
 
Lin (2002) chose operating cost, total deposit, fixed asset, the number of staff, 
average salary and interest expenditure as input variables and only selected total 
loan as an output variable. The variable setting was to compare the cost efficiency of 
43 merged and non-merged Taiwanese commercial banks. The result was about the 
operation efficiency considering acquisition.  
 
Wang et al (2005) turned to study commercial banks in mainland China in 2004. 
Capital and asset are selected as input variables while net income, return on total 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) are chose as output variables respectively. His 
result showed that among 4 state-owned banks and 12 commercial banks in the 
sample, 2 banks had ƐĐĂůĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ?ďĂŶŬƐŚĂĚĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƌĞƚƵƌŶƐƚŽƐĐĂůĞ ? ?ďĂŶŬƐ ?
returns to scale were increasing, and 7 banks suffered decreasing returns to scale. 
The result illustrated that when loan grew up, the bank efficiency decreased. So it 
was concluded that banks could not achieve efficiency by increasing total loans. 
Sakar (2006) combined the studies of Siems and Wang et al. and improved the input 
variables which were the number of branches, the average number of branch staff, 
total assets, total loans and total deposits. Whereas output items were the ratio of 
net interest revenue to asset, ratio of net interest revenue to operating revenue, 
ratio of non-interest revenue to asset, ROA, and ROE.  
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We can conclude from these studies that an efficient bank theoretically can spend 
fewer inputs like interest expense and capital and labor expense because lower 
interest expenses indicates a correspondingly less usage of intermediate funds, and 
produce more outputs like loans and investments. In sum, efficiency studies normally 
treat assets and costs as inputs while loans are typically considered as outputs. 
 
As we set the purpose to measure bank efficiency including management quality and 
operation efficiency, we use three inputs: loanable funds (which includes deposits 
and short-term funding), fixed assets, number of employees. Their prices are average 
interest paid per unit of deposits, non-interest expense per unit fixed assets and 
personnel expenses per unit employee numbers respectively. The two outputs are 
total loans and equity. Their prices are average interest expense from loans and 
equity return per unit equity. In the models, the total cost is calculated by interest 
expense pluses non-interest expense, and the profit is particularly stood by operating 
profit. Table 2 demonstrates the input/output variables. 
 
The variable setting follows three critical factors. First, the variables are selected due 
to related literature discussion. Second, input and output variables must match the 
items to evaluate and must be necessary in the analysis method. Finally, we should 
guarantee each variable can be quantified.  
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5.2. Determinants and hypothesis 
We classify the potential determinants of bank efficiency into three categories: 
bank-specific variables, risk profile and crisis characteristic. The bank-specific 
variables group contains profitability which is substituted by the ratio of return on 
assets (ROA), ownership type and bank size. Ownership type is accounted by two 
dummy variables SOCB for state-owned banks and JSCB for foreign capital holding 
banks. As to bank size, the natural logarithm of total assets (LTA) is the proxy. The 
second group risk profile consists of credit risk, capital risk, liquidity risk and asset 
quality. Loan-loss-reserves to gross loans (LG), equity to assets (ETA), net loans to 
total assets (NLTA) and impaired loans to equity (ILE) are descripted for these risks 
respectively. Finally, the crisis characteristic is concluded to be represented by GDP 
level which can show the economic conditions pre and post financial crisis. The 
summary of variables descriptions and definitions are listed in Table 3. 
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With respect to the bank-specific variables, there is a common finding that the more 
profitable banks, which presents as a high ROA or ROE, the more efficient they 
appear to be. Most empirical literature (e.g. Mester, 1996; Carbo et al., 2002, 
Ataullah et al., 2004; Casu & Girardone, 2004; Chang & Chiu, 2006) concluded this 
positive relationship between profitability and efficiency. Undoubtedly, we use ROA 
to present the probability and follow these studies to set the hypothesis as follows: 
 ܪଵǣ ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏܽ݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁ݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ݄݅݌ܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܾܽ݊݇݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܽ݊݀݌ݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕǤ 
 
While coming to the bank size and efficiency, there are mixed results and the 
relationship is not clearly defined in the literature. Several studies (for instance, 
Berger et al., 1993; Miller & Noulas, 1996; Ataullah et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2005) 
reported that bank size has significantly and significantly negative relationship, while 
Isik & Hassan (2002) and Girardone et al. (2004) concluded the same result as well. 
Although economic scales and economic scopes are positively related to bank size, 
Carbo et al. (2002) found no significant relationship between size and bank efficiency 
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(Pi & Timme, 1993; Berger & Mester, 1997) got the same conclusion as well). 
However, we can theoretically reckon that the larger banks are more cost efficient 
than the smaller banks because the large banks have more opportunities to establish 
efficient structures to operate and manage. On the other hand, larger banks have a 
large number of branches, departments and employees. This may attribute cost 
inefficiency. In our study, we follow the majority studies and make the hypothesis 
bellows: 
 ܪଶǣ ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏܽ݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁ݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ݄݅݌ܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܾܽ݊݇݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܽ݊݀ܾܽ݊݇ݏ݅ݖ݁Ǥ 
 
As to the ownership, we narrow our review of the recent literature to the studies 
about the Chinese banks and there are some controversial arguments. The results of 
the many studies indicated that state-owned and foreign banks are the most cost 
efficient (e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 1997; Havrylchyk, 2006), while other showed the 
opposite conclusions (Fu & Heffernan, 2005; Berger et al., 2006 Ariff & Can, 2008). 
Undeniable, there are still some uncertain factors to make the relationship uncertain 
and mixed. Accordingly, we still believe that ownership is an essential factor so our 
hypotheses are showed below: 
 ܪଷǣ ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏܽ݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁ݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ݄݅݌ܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܾܽ݊݇݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܽ݊݀݋ݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌Ǥ 
 
The second group of variables includes all financial ratios which can illustrate risk 
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elements. Banks which provide more loans are expected to induce higher credit risk 
which can be explained by the ratio of loan loss reservation to gross loans and the 
ratio of gross loans to total assets. Carvallo & Kasman (2005) and Casu & Girardone 
(2004) indicated that higher ratio of loan loss provisions or reserves to total loans 
proves that the banks are more likely to have higher risk-taking level. These banks 
may be less efficient. On the contrary, there are still some researches (for example, 
Brewer & Lee, 1986; Mansur et al., 1993; Hassan, 2003) showed that credit risk is 
positively related to the bank efficiency, which means that high credit risk can also 
attribute to high level of efficiency. Generally, credit risk is expected to incur an 
inverse relationship with efficiency (e.g. Brewer & Lee, 1986; Mansur et al., 1993; 
Hassan, 2005). Hence, we follow the majority of the studies to hypothesize that: 
 ܪସǣ ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏܽ݊݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ݄݅݌ܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܾܽ݊݇݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܽ݊݀ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐݎ݅ݏ݇Ǥ 
 
Nevertheless, the studies of capital risk did not provide clear evidence. In our study, 
the ratio of equity to assets is selected as a proxy for capital risk. Berger & Mester 
(1997) pointed out that the negative relationship between capital risk and efficiency 
is expected as issuing shares to raise money and increase equity may incurs more 
transaction costs than gaining deposits. Although equity is a more expensive funding 
source compared to deposits, Berger & Mester (1997) suggested that the 
implications on cost efficiency are not straightforward. Similarly, Altunbas et al. (2004) 
and Freixas & Rochet (1997) showed the same result that the relationship of 
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efficiency and capital levels was negative. However, Carvallo & Kasman (2005) 
proposed that the banks with higher efficiency will indicate higher profitability so 
that results in more earnings and equity. Moreover, Chang & Chiu (2006) suggested 
the positive relationship between bank efficiency and capital risk. According to these 
results, we consider the equity to be an important way to reflect the bank funding 
method and retained earnings which do have a positively impact on the bank 
efficiency. 
 ܪହǣ ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏܽ݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁ݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ݄݅݌ܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܾܽ݊݇݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܽ݊݀ܿܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽݎ݅ݏ݇Ǥ 
 
We follow Williams & Nguyen (2005) to set the ratio of net loans to total assets as a 
proxy for liquidity risk. More loans might help banks to diversify the credit risk and 
provide evidence of high effectiveness of funding, while more loans gave out may 
attribute higher impaired and non-performing loan ratio and then cause high 
liquidity risk. Jahankhani & Lynge (1980) and Mansur et al. (1993) set the ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets to present liquidity risk, and they concluded that there is 
a negative relationship between liquidity risk and bank efficiency. Similarly, Ariff & 
Can (2008) also came to the same conclusion that liquidity risk is significantly and 
negatively associated to the efficiency, though the liquidity proxy is loans to deposits. 
Meanwhile, they changed the variable to the customer and short-term funds and 
found liquidity risk is positively related to the efficiency. However, in essence, these 
studies suggested that liquidity risk may positively or negatively relate to bank 
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efficiency, we try first to hypothesize the positive relationship between high net loans 
to total assets and efficiency. 
 ܪ଺ǣ ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏܽ݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁ݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ݄݅݌ܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܾܽ݊݇݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܽ݊݀݈݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕݎ݅ݏ݇Ǥ 
 
In general, the asset quality is always represented by non-performing loans or 
impaired loans. It is argued that non-performing provisions and impaired loans may 
have detrimental effects on banks because banks are more likely to pay more 
managerial efforts and additional expenditures to deal with the problem. Specifically, 
the expenditures are spent in several ways. Karim et al. (2010) pointed out that the 
banks need to monitor the careless borrowers, maintain and analyze the workout 
arrangements, and dispose and manage collaterals. In recent years, a number of 
researchers took the asset quality, specifically non-performing loans and impaired 
loans, into account. Wheelock & Wilson (1995) and Berger & Humphrey (1992) 
summarized that failing banks with a large amount of non-performing loans perform 
far from the best-practice banks. That is to say, banks with high ratio of problem 
loans have lower cost efficiency. In addition, a number of other studies also fund 
negative relationships between bank efficiency and impaired loans (Kwan & Eisenbeis, 
1995; DeYoung, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2000; Fan and Shaffer, 2004; Girardone et al., 
2004). A negative relationship between problem loans and bank efficiency suggests 
the positive relationship between asset quality and efficiency. It is true and obvious 
that massive non-performing loans may signal banks utilize fewer resources for credit 
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evaluation and loan monitoring process than the benchmarked banks and this largely 
results in bank inefficiency. So we hypothesize like that: 
 ܪ଻ǣ ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏܽ݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁ݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ݄݅݌ܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܾܽ݊݇݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܽ݊݀ܽݏݏ݁ݐݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕǤ 
 
Finally, we add the macroeconomic development variable to the regression model. 
Per capita GDP is demonstrated in logarithm form and serves as a proxy measure for 
the overall level of development, including the quality of state institutions and the 
level of skills. This variable can capture the effect of economic recession and booming. 
As other variables are correlated with GDP, bank performance will dependent on 
business cycle and economic environment, and bank business will grow according to 
the growth of the GDP level. In booming, financial infrastructures like stock market 
and other financial institutions and enterprises will increase their demand on 
financing like loans and deposits. Additionally, costs may decrease due to the overall 
economy development and corresponding improvements of business quality. This 
will directly increase the bank efficiency. In downturn, the situation is vice versa. 
Hence, several studies showed the positive relationship between bank efficiency and 
GDP and the measure is statistically significant (Kedah, 2002; Grigorian & Manole, 
2002; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2002). However, Anayiotos et al. (2010) and Fries & Taci 
(2005) found no significant link of bank efficiency with GDP growth. According to 
Rezvanian et al. (2011), we hypothesize that the GDP level is positively related to 
bank efficiency.  
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 ܪ଼ǣ ݐ݄݁ݎ݁݅ݏܽ݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁ݎ݈݁ܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ݄݅݌ܾ݁ݐݓ݁݁݊ܾܽ݊݇݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܽ݊݀݁ܿ݋݊݋݉݅ܿ݀݁ݒ݈݁݋݌݉݁݊ݐǤ 
 
6. Empirical results and findings 
6.1. Cost and profit efficiency 
Some notes should be made from the scores displayed in Table 4. To summarize, the 
overall cost efficiency score is 0.6271 which indicates that the Chinese commercial 
banks in our sample incur, or rather waste, around 40% of their costs to produce no 
economic profit comparing to the benchmark bank. What is worse, the mean value 
of profit efficiency is 0.1633 which suggests that under the same condition the 
sample banks only obtain the profit nearly one sixth of the profits earned by the 
best-performance bank. Furthermore, there is a fact concluded that the profit 
efficiency scores are considerably lower than the scores of cost efficiency and 
basically the alternative standard efficiency scores are below the level of the 
standard profit efficiency. It is obvious to note that the joint stock commercial banks 
appear to be the most cost efficienct and profit efficienct while the state-owned 
banks show the lowest level. Rural and city commercial banks are just in the middle. 
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Turning to cost efficiency which is showed in Figure 1, the four types of banks display 
the distinct performances. It is very clear that the JSCBs lead in every year from 2003 
to 2010 and appear to be the most efficient on average (0.7463). Interestingly, the 
SOCBs oppositely show the lowest average level of cost efficiency (0.5625) and the 
most inefficiency in every year. The RCBs and the CCBs lie in the middle. Among the 
eight years, the average level of cost efficiency do not change that much and the 
standard deviation of it is 0.0823. Considering the recent global financial crisis, the 
year 2007 is very crucial to divide the pre-crisis period and post-crisis period. About 
the JSCBs and the CCBs, there is an explicit trend that from 2003 to 2007 that their 
levels of cost efficiency go up to the peak with the rising rate of around 40% and 80% 
respectively. Although in 2004 the RCBs and the SOCBs show the relatively small 
decline, afterwards their efficiency scores keep rising to the highest point. Beyond 
the year 2007, all banks of the four types except the SOCBs suffer the 17% or so 
decrease in the cost efficiency. In this case, we have reason to believe that the 
financial crisis to a certain degree cause unfavorable effects on cost efficiency. Overall, 
taking all the banks together, the cost efficiency score ascends to the highest in 2007 
(0.7134) prior to going down to 0.5951 after the financial crisis. 
 
Figure 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the cost efficiency, standard profit efficiency and 
alternative profit efficiency respectively. They provide a comparison among these 
four types of banks and show a clear trend about efficiency level during the period. 
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On standard profit efficiency, the profit level of every bank type fluctuates 
substantially along with the years and keeps under the 0.4 (0.1633) which is 
considerably lower than the cost efficiency level (0.6271). Separately, the JSCBs are 
the most profit efficient which have the mean score of 0.2132 while the standard 
deviation is also the highest (0.1051) which is higher than the second one 0.2 points. 
The CCBs follow the first place and enjoy the relatively good performance with 
average level of 0.1687. The efficiency levels of the SOCBs and the RCBs are far below 
the average level (0.0295 and 0.1268 respectively) and the SOCBs represent the 
lowest score of profit efficiency in every single year and finally maintain it at a very 
low level with a minor standard deviation (0.0334). All the banks experience the ups 
and downs before and after the financial crisis. The year 2007 sees the highest score 
of each category except the RCBs which undergo the trend of drop and postpone 
their peak to the year 2008. After 2007, the score of the CCBs falls slightly but still 
remains between the interval of 0.2 to 0.25 and the RCBs keeps their efficiency level 
around 0.2 as well. However, the JSCBs and the SOCBs suffer the sharp slump by 32% 
and 90% respectively. The JSBCs lose the leading place and end with the score 
around 0.1 while the level of the SOCBs still maintains below 0.1. It is apparent that 
the SOCBs are the most profit inefficient and the financial crisis does affect the 
efficiency level to fluctuate and decrease. The JSCBs appear to be the most 
vulnerable to the crisis. 
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In terms of the alternative profit efficiency, there are some differences comparing to 
standard profit efficiency. The overall mean level of alternative profit efficiency is 
13.25% lower than that of the standard profit efficiency. On average, the RCBs, 
instead of the JSCBs, prove to be the most efficient (0.1597), followed by the CCBs 
(0.1590) with a slight gap. Unsurprisingly, the SOCBs perform the worst (0.0503), 
while the average score of the JSCBs (0.0967) is just a bit higher than that of the 
SOBCs. The alternative profit efficiency level of the JSCBs fluctuates and descends by 
about 50% over the whole period. While the efficiency levels of the SOBCs, the JSCBs 
and the RCBs have decreased by almost 80%, 60% and 90% respectively, that of the 
CCBs has significantly increased by about three times over the period of 2003 to 
2005. In 2007, the SOCBs take the highest score (0.2078) among these banks and the 
score reaches the peak before going down sharply. Interestingly, the level of the RCBs 
suffers the second lowest in 2007 and then rises drastically to the highest point 
(0.2708). From 2008 to 2010, the RCBs keep their efficiency level around 0.25 which 
is much higher than that of any other banks. Over the period of 2005 to 2008, the 
efficiency level of the CCBs nearly keeps even and no large fluctuations showed prior 
to the dramatic decrease after 2008.  
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Figure 1.  Cost efficiency (CE) 
 
Figure 2.  Standard profit efficiency 
 
Figure 3.  Alternative profit efficiency 
 
Generally speaking, cost efficiency, standard profit efficiency and alternative profit 
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
SOBC
JSBC
RCC
CCB
0.0000
0.0500
0.1000
0.1500
0.2000
0.2500
0.3000
0.3500
0.4000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
SOBC
JSBC
RCC
CCB
0.0000
0.0500
0.1000
0.1500
0.2000
0.2500
0.3000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
SOBC
JSBC
RCC
CCB
54 
 
efficiency represent the similar trend over the whole period that the mean scores 
improve before 2007 but drop after 2007. The reason for this could be due in part to 
the potential risks and economy recession caused by the financial crisis. Because of 
this crisis, it is feasible to believe that the elements related to the political and 
economic instability in China may diminish the capability of the banks to efficiently 
manage operating costs and dampen profits. Under this circumstance, banks prefer 
to reduce their activities, which may reduce the profit efficiency. 
 
Moreover, some previous studies (e.g. Barry, 1998; Bos & Schmiedel, 2003) 
summarized a principle that profit efficient banks appear to be also cost efficient, but 
the inverse is not necessarily practicable. In contrast in our study, the banks which 
are the most cost efficient are still the most profit efficient in China. Bos & Schmiedel 
(2003) state that the banks which are profit efficient are also cost efficient in a 
perfect competitive market. While Tabak et al. (2011) point out in an imperfect 
competitive market profit efficient banks may be cost inefficient. Hence, in our study 
we can conclude that Chinese bank market is a relatively perfect and fair competitive 
market. 
 
Our study shows an interesting finding that the profit efficiency level is far below the 
cost efficiency level. This finding is consistent with most previous studies (e.g. Berger 
& Mester, 1997; Maudos et al., 2002; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007). The profit 
efficiency scores are so small for two reasons. First, the primary objective of these 
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banks is not always profit maximization or better capitalization especially the SOCBs. 
The social objective like promote economic development is more important. Second, 
all the banks are included in the banking system controlled by the central bank and 
regulatory commission. Meanwhile, the CCBs are also under the supervisions of local 
governments. Banking behaviors including aggressive and speculative activities are 
strictly confined. So focusing on the value enhancement of the banks instead of 
carrying amount of profit makes more sense. 
 
In addition, the overall alternative profit efficiency score is 13% lower than that of 
standard profit efficiency. This explains the existence of market power in pricing bank 
products in China. The finding supports the result of Ariff & Can (2008) and Tabak et 
al. (2011) but contradicts that of Maudos & Pastor (2003). 
 
Chen et al. (2005) demonstrates that the SOCBs and CCBs are the most cost efficient 
compared to the JSCBs. However, our result is that the JSCBs are the most cost and 
profit efficient while the SOCBs are the most inefficient. The result confirms the 
conclusions drawn by Wei & Wang (2000), Zhong et al. (2001), Matthews et al. (2009) 
and Fu & Heffernan (2005). On account of the features of the JSCB establishment, on 
the one hand, joint stock banks can reduce the operation costs and solve 
management and technical difficulties given the superiority of sharing management 
experience, capital and technology. On the other hand, multi parties bear the 
operation risks to guarantee the efficiency and effectiveness of business. Additionally, 
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the JSCBs can require incentives in China like favorable taxation policy, additional 
investment policy and deficit cover policy. Therefore, based on the benefits 
mentioned above, the JSCBs take advantages over other banks to be the most cost 
and profit efficient.  
 
Compared to the JSCBs, the SOCB are the most inefficient. It is not surprising to 
achieve this result. There are several drawbacks gave rise to the inefficiency. From 
the perspective of internal organization system, the labor division was unclear and 
too many administrational departments exist. If banks overemphasized the 
administration and hierarchy, the strength of business units would be weakened. 
Furthermore, redundancy and functional overlap of department were the major 
problems which would lead to excessive expenditures on employees and operation 
inefficiency as well. From the perspective of external banking system, the 
market-oriented reforms of the banking sector in China lagged behind the structural 
change in the real economy. Although the shares separating reform was put into 
practice, the result after reform was still uncertain. The credit structure and capital 
allocation displayed serious imbalances. There is a fact that the state-owned banks 
expanded credit business and accumulated massive non-performing assets but they 
ĂƌĞ “ƚŽŽďŝŐƚŽĨĂŝů ?ĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůďĂŶŬ ?Because of 
the social objectives of the SOCBs to stabilize the national economy and excessive 
impaired loans and non-performing assets, it is not likely for the SOCBs to optimize 
their profits. As a result, the unreasonable organization and inequitable financial 
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regime combined together to bring about the inefficiency of the SOCBs.  
 
As all the efficiency scores show an apparent turning point in 2007, we can conclude 
that Chinese banking system is inextricably linked to the global economy, because the 
subprime crisis first happened in America in 2007 and then expanded to other 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĞƐ ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝŶĞƐĞ ďĂŶŬŝŶŐ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŚĂƐ ĂŶƚĞĚĂƚŝŶŐ Žƌ
immediately response to the changes but there is no sufficient evidence to support 
this notion. 
 
6.2. Potential determinants of efficiency 
Considering the regression independent variables including bank-specific variables, 
risk profile and crisis environment, we show the Tobit regression equation in details: ܧܨܨ ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܴܱܣ ൅ ߚଷܮܶܣ ൅ ߚସܱܵܥܤ ൅ ߚହܬܵܥܤ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܥܤ ൅ ߚ଻ܥܥܤ ൅ ߚ଼ܮܩ൅ ߚଽܧܶܣ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܰܮܶܣ ൅ ߚଵଵܫܮܧ ൅ ߚଵଶܩܦܲ ൅ ߝ௜ 
We run three regressions about cost efficiency, standard profit efficiency and 
alternative profit efficiency respectively. The number of observations is 368 and the 
Prob > ଶis 0 which means that at least one of the regression coefficients in the 
model is not equal to zero. Meanwhile, LR ଶ explains the similar thing. All the 
three models are fitted models and have high explanatory power. 
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Table 5 indicates the determinants of the bank efficiency. The dummy variable CCB is 
omitted. Taking profitability first, it is apparent that all coefficients on ROA are 
positive and very significant at 0.000. This is consistent with what we expected 
previously and suggests that the more profitable banks appear to be more cost and 
profit efficient. Specifically, in our study one unit increase in profitability may result in 
9.3%, 25.7% and 14.3% growth in cost, profit and alternative profit efficiency 
respectively. High profitability has a very crucially positive influence on bank 
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? dŚĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝŐŚ ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŵĂŬĞ ďĂŶŬƐ ? ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ŐƌŽǁ
rapidly and appropriate resource allocation can promote the banke efficiency. Our 
result is consistent with the studies conducted by Mester (1996), Carbo et al. (2002), 
Ataullah et al. (2004) etc.  
 
Turning to the impact of size (LTA) on efficiency, the reported coefficient is positive 
and very significant except on alternative profit efficiency. This means that the 
large-sized banks are the most cost and profit efficient and then the medium-sized 
banks followed by the small banks with the lowest efficiency scores. Interestingly, the 
largest banks, which are also known as the SOCBs, show the lowest efficiency scores 
adversely. In theory, large bank size implies economy of scales and scale efficiency 
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and is probably to attribute to high level of cost and profit efficiency. However, the 
performance of the SOCBs indicates the opposite. The reason can be explained that 
to a certain degree large scale and size do generate high operating efficiency because 
of complete established structure but could also lead to relatively high operating 
costs like high labor commissions because of massive employees. Carbo et al. (2002), 
Pi & Timme (1993) and Berger & Mester (1997) sited this reason, but our finding 
supports that of Isik & Hassan (2002), Girardone et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2005). 
 
In terms of ownership, the coefficients on SOCB are negative in all three efficiency 
estimations and very significant (0.000) for cost efficiency and standard profit 
efficiency and significant at 1.3% for alternative profit efficiency. On the other hand, 
the coefficients on RCB and JSCB are all negativĞ ĞǆĐĞƉƚ :^ ?Ɛ ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĐŽƐƚ
efficiency. However, they are not significant. Hence, as we expected, the lowest 
efficiency level of the SOCBs is partially affected by its ownership type. While there 
are no obvious relationships between ownership and bank efficiency of other banks 
especially JSCB. That is to say, the high efficiency level of JSCB is determined by other 
factors. The result reverses the previous hypothesis and supports the conclusions of 
Fu & Heffernan (2005), Berger et al. (2006) and Ariff & Can (2008), but still 
overturned that of Bhattacharya et al. (1997) and Havrylchyk (2006). 
 
On the relationship between credit risk and efficiency, as expected, banks with higher 
ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (LG) tend to have lower cost efficiency. This 
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negative but very significant (at 0.3%) relationship suggests that higher loan loss 
reserves will incur higher credit risk. On the contrary, the coefficients on profit 
estimations are positive and also significant at about 4%. There is an explanation 
underlying that the more loans banks lend out, the more reserves set aside to cover 
the estimated loss loan in loan portfolio. The result about cost efficiency is the same 
as the previous hypothesis which is supported by Carvallo & Kasman (2005) and Casu 
& Girardone (2004). In terms of profit efficiency, the result shows consistent with 
that of Brewer & Lee (1986), Mansur et al. (1993) and Hassan (2003). 
 
In Chinese commercial banks, the loan loss reserves are generally categorized into 
two types: one is general reserve which is calculated as 1% of the loan balance; the 
other one is special reserve which is set differently based on the repayment ability 
and risk of borrowers. If the amount of loan loss reserves increases, there may be 
two main reasons. The one is that the amount of loans lent increases as well; the 
other one is that too many loans cannot be paid off due to aggressive lending 
behavior and insufficiency of strict risk rating to the borrowers. When coming to the 
details, the lending business is a major and vitally important business to the SOCBs. 
Given that the main function of SOCB is to provide sufficient and appropriate funds 
to support social constructions and business operation, the scale of the loans they 
lend is large. After 2007, the recession emerged in China and hence this downturn 
ůŽǁĞƌĞĚƚŚĞďŽƌƌŽǁĞƌƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƌĞƉĂǇƚŚĞůŽĂŶƐĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůůǇbanks had to set aside 
more loan loss reserves. The high risks on loan lending brought down the profit 
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efficiency but increased the cost inefficiency. Instead, since 2006, the JSCBs and the 
CCBs diversified their banking businesses and expanded innovations into emerging 
markets like short-term financing bonds, corporate annuity fund and trade finance. 
These banks had more channels to get profits and successfully diversified business 
risks. Therefore, their performance about cost and profit efficiency is much better, 
especially the JSCBs, than the SOCBs.  
 
On the other hand, the coefficients on equity to assets (ETA) are all positive but the P 
values show no significant relationships. It is assumed that the increase or decrease 
in equity would have no obvious effects on bank efficiency. Given the unobvious 
implication, our result supports that of Berger & Mester (1997). Theoretically, the 
higher participation of shareholders, the more efficient the banks show because 
banks may feel more obliged to operate efficiently and effectively. Therefore, it may 
conclude that the shareholders have less power to affect and promote the operation 
of Chinese commercial banks. Although the joint stock reform made some progresses 
in banking system, the control of local government and central bank still take over 
the motivations of shareholders.  
 
The coefficients on net loans to total assets (NLTA) are significantly positive on cost 
efficiency and standard profit efficiency but not significant on alternative profit 
efficiency. This indicates that banks attempt to capitalize on the assets which tend to 
be rational utilized. This banking behavior in turn could increase the efficiency level. 
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Although NLTA is an important determinant to the efficiency, the coefficients are 
relatively too small for this variable to make a great impact on efficiency scores since 
the one unit change in NLTA ratio only will make about 0.9% change in efficiency 
scores. Hence, it is not surprising to interpret that the SOCBs which have 
monopolized the market share of deposit and loans still obtained lowest cost and 
profit efficiency scores, because the strength of the effects caused by the loans is 
slight and not so much obvious. Our study obtains the same result as that of 
Jahankhani & Lynge (1980) and Mansur et al. (1993).    
 
A similar result is found regarding the relationship between asset quality and 
efficiency. The coefficients on impaired loans to equity (ILE) are all negative and only 
significant to cost efficiency. It is obvious that too many impaired loans may occupy 
much time and many labors to manage and collect. In this case, the costs on it will 
increase and in turn cause cost inefficient. Particularly, after 2007 financial crisis, 
more impaired loans incurred and share prices fell to make equity shrink heavily, so 
this seriously affected the cost efficiency level to go down in and after financial crisis. 
The asset quality mainly affects the cost efficiency while the profit efficiency is not 
significantly influenced because Chinese government injected a large amount of 
money to cover the impaired loans of commercial banks. The result verifies the 
previous hypothesis and supports that of the most studies (e.g. Kwan & Eisenbeis, 
1995; DeYoung, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2000, etc). 
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Considering the macroeconomic factor, the relationship between economic 
development (GDP) and efficiency is negatively significant. Before the financial crisis, 
the market appeared to be active and dynamic, the SOCBs were able to attract the 
majority of deposits of the public with less interest expenses, while the JSCBs, CCBs 
and RCBs had more opportunities to focus on their featured business and innovate in 
their services in emerging market. Hence, the efficiency scores increased before the 
crisis. When the crisis struck the stock market, investor confidence was suffered and 
the growth of Chinese economy slowed down. Under the continued restrictive 
financial environment, banks experienced the recession had difficulties to get 
adequate funds to make loans with low interest expenses and the expansion of other 
emerging businesses encountered troubles as well. Therefore, banks underwent an 
upward pressure on their cost and profit efficiency. Our study indicates the same 
result with that of Kedah (2002), Grigorian & Manole (2002) and Yildirim & 
Philippatos (2002). 
 
7. Conclusion 
For the past twenty years, the Chinese banking system has experienced instructional 
restructuring, partial privatization and modernization to increase the core 
competitiveness of commercial banks. Foreign investment strategy and IPO strategy 
are the two main methods for partial privatization and modernization. Moreover, 
many other efforts were made to improve asset quality, reduce non-performing loans, 
enhance the process of credit assessment and monitoring, apply proper skills and 
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techniques of risk management, and finally promote the overall bank performance. 
After joining WTO, Chinese banks drove the reform forward and cultivated some 
positive motivations to accept the fully-opened market and competitiveness. 
However, the global financial crisis may have adverse effects in the short term or long 
term. Under this circumstance, it is a real challenge for the state-owned banks to 
maintain their traditional businesses and for the joint-stock banks and other regional 
banks to expand their operations beyond the limitations of locality. So in this way, it 
is undoubted that Chinese commercial banks should pay more attention to achieve a 
high level of cost and profit efficiency. 
 
Our study aims to examine the bank efficiency and to test whether the financial crisis 
have impacts on the efficiency. The research has some differences from previous 
empirical studies in many ways. First, we employ the DEA approach and take into 
account three efficiency estimations: cost efficiency, standard profit efficiency and 
alternative profit efficiency. Second, we select 69 commercial banks to form a sample 
whose size is sufficient enough. The sample covers four types of banks: state-owned 
commercial bank, joint-stock commercial bank, city commercial banks and rural 
commercial banks. The study compares the efficiency among these bank groups. 
Third, we conduct the second stage analysis to identify potential determinants of the 
efficiency of Chinese banks. Forth, the financial crisis is considered to analyze the 
trend and fluctuation of the efficiency scores.  
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The findings of our study provide the evidence that, over the period, the joint-stock 
banks are the most efficient than other three types of banks, followed by the city 
commercial banks and rural commercial banks, while the state-owned commercial 
banks have the lowest level of all efficiency estimations. Furthermore, profit 
efficiency score is smaller than cost efficiency score and alternative profit efficiency is 
lower than standard profit efficiency. In addition, every type of banks undergoes a 
rise in cost and profit efficiency before the 2007-2008 financial crisis but experiences 
decrease after the financial crisis. Despite the effects of the financial crisis during this 
period, the state-owned commercial banks display no improvement in their 
performance and their efficiency remains at a very low level. 
 
In the second stage we use Tobit regression to investigate the potential determinants 
of bank efficiency. Our study makes several hypotheses and compares the results 
with that of the previous empirical findings. In essential, the results confirm the 
estimation of the first stage study that the joint-stock commercial banks are more 
efficient than the state-owned commercial banks, and that medium-sized banks have 
higher bank efficiency than large-sized and small-sized banks. Moreover, the banks 
with high profitability, low credit risks and high liquidity are both cost and profit 
efficient. However, high asset quality can attribute to high level of cost profitability 
while there is no significant link between asset quality and profit efficiency. 
Additionally, we find no statistically significant relationship between capital risk and 
bank efficiency. Finally, the economic development and environment are positively 
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associated with cost and profit efficiency. 
 
In the light of the above results, we can draw some implications and suggestions. 
First, the benefits of partial privatization and modernization are showed because of 
the high cost and profit efficiency of the joint-stock commercial banks. Hence, the 
strategy to promote different equity stakes, especially those of foreign investment 
and local enterprises, is in the right direction. This allows enterprises and foreign 
investment to access the domestic retail banking market and the joint-stock 
commercial banks in turn are beneficial from risk management skills, technology 
information and mutual communication of operational management. In particular, 
the banks adopt risk management skills to control impaired loans and monitor the 
credit process. Moreover, under this circumstance, regulatory commission and other 
institutions make very attempt to provide better protection to depositors and 
borrowers which will also improve bank efficiency. In addition, the majority of the 
joint-stock commercial banks in China are medium-sized which are less likely 
constrained by the extensive non-performing loans of large-sized banks and less 
resources of businesses of small-sized banks. 
 
Second, in the network, the overall deposit and loan shares, and asset size of the 
state-owned commercial banks are still in a monopoly position. That is to say, the 
state-owned commercial banks take great advantages in the traditional banking 
products and services, and the joint-stock banks may have difficulties in capturing 
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shares of these traditional banking businesses. However, taking on a look in the 
future, the profitability of single business of deposits and loans will inevitably reduce 
due to the development of the banking reform. On the contrary, the emerging 
market for financial innovations and products about money management will show 
higher operating return and achieve more developments. It indicates that the 
state-owned banks can not only focus on their traditional business, but also diversify 
and extend their business in order to reverse the low level of cost and profit 
efficiency.  
 
Third, the exploration of the determinants of cost and profit efficiency implies that 
profitability and efficiency are closely related. During this period, banks should not 
simply take aggressive behaviors to obtain high income or earnings, but should also 
make profits efficiently considering the cost-to-income ratio or other standards. 
However, higher profitability is still a very important driving force for the banks to 
improve bank efficiency and meet the demand of growing economy and 
modernization reform.  
 
Apart from profitability, banks need more complete process to assess their credit risk, 
asset quality and liquidity risk. The three elements play a vital role for operations. A 
large volume of non-performing loans was carried in many Chinese commercial 
banks, especially in the state-owned banks. Actually, this problem is still leaved to be 
resolved by using massive funds to cover. But in long run, the assessment and 
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ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ĂŶĚ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌ ďĂŶŬƐ ? ĐƌĞĚŝƚ ĂŶĚ
capital structure. 
 
Forth, it is obvious that economy environment have great impacts on the bank 
performance. Despite the banking reform for decades, the financial crisis makes the 
bank efficiency fluctuate pre and post-crisis. This suggests that an internal 
mechanism through management level and business strategy units should be set to 
serve the functions of enterprise wide risk management. To be specific, banks ought 
to cultivate the awareness of risk and establish various reporting lines. Moreover, 
agency problem should be dealt with to avoid risk-taking behaviors at the expense of 
ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?dŚĞĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽƌĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚƌŝƐŬ
management mechanism is needed to cope with financial crisis and to stabilize the 
bank efficiency even in the recessions. 
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